urbanization was the only way out of poverty, the Bank pronounced at the end of the conference. There was very little discussion on the effects of a state-led and often forcible urbanization program vis-à-vis those of a market-driven urbanization process.
It would seem preposterous to even ask the question, "What is wrong with Shanghai?" The purpose of this chapter is to show that plenty is wrong with the city. The basic idea is that the impressive skylines and the exalted GDP performance in fact mask a troubling reality-its indigenous corporate sector is deeply problematic. In this paper, I stay away from the usual indicators that economists use to look at China-GDP, export and FDI-but focus on the microeconomic dimensions of Shanghai. In particular, the state of entrepreneurship and the innovative activities in Shanghai have performed very poorly in the 1990s and in the 2000s even against some of the benchmarks that Shanghai should have trumped very easily (such as some poor, agricultural and interior regions of the country).
Furthermore, some of the indicators show that Shanghai has performed poorly not only relative to others but relative to its own past in the 1980s and early 1990s.
Much of the hype about Shanghai is heavily based on impressions (and on GDP data). The "Shanghai miracle" is always assumed, but not demonstrated. The "tyranny of numbers," in the words of Alwyn Young (1995) , has led me to question the very foundation of this miracle. For this book project, I have assembled a large number of data from diverse sources-well-designed household surveys, private-sector surveys and a comprehensive, professionally-managed patent database. Apart from the fact that these data get at the important microeconomic dimensions of Shanghai, they have another distinct advantage over GDP and FDI data: GDP and FDI data are explicit benchmarks used by the Chinese political system to promote or demote officials. The data I will use are not used this way.
Indeed there are some large, unexplained discrepancies between the survey data and the GDP data-namely that GDP data show Shanghai to be much richer than the survey data. 18,501 yuan in Shanghai and 15,881 yuan Zhejiang. This gives rise to a Shanghai/Zhejiang ratio of 1.17. The discrepancy between these two ratios in and of itself does not suggest statistical falsification. One possibility is that the income share of GDP in Zhejiang is much Here are some of the major findings based on a largely descriptive analysis of the aforementioned data.
3 By the two measures of entrepreneurship-self employment businesses and indigenous private sector firms, Shanghai compares poorly with the rest of the country along many dimensions. Shanghai has the highest GDP per capita in the country. In 2005, its GDP per capita was 12% higher than the second-highest GDP per capita in the country-that of Beijing and it is 3.66 times the national average. Yet the per capita income from operating self-employment businesses in Shanghai is a fraction of the national average in the rural-to-rural comparison and about the same as the national average in the urban-to-urban comparison. 4 The performance of rural entrepreneurship in Shanghai is especially remarkable. The Shanghai rural entrepreneurs have a huge locational advantage-by being located close to a massive, cosmopolitan and rapidly-developing
metropolis. Yet, their per capita business income started out at 1.44 times that of the national average in 1985 but the ratio declined to 0.46 in 2005 during a twenty-year period of a supposedly massive boom.
Despite a rich history of creating some of the largest businesses in China and in Asia in the first part of the 20 th century, the average size of Shanghai private-sector firms is among the smallest in the country by employment and is on the smaller side by sales.
Despite the image of the city as a high-tech hub, the private-sector firms in Shanghai, on average, are less likely to hold patents and/or hold fewer patents than private sector firms based in the heavily agricultural, poor and interior province of Yunnan. Aggregate data on patenting activities-measured by annual patent grants-show that in the 1990s Shanghai experienced a steep decline in patenting activities relative to Zhejiang and Guangdong, two provinces that are the most entrepreneurial in China but are widely believed to be low-tech.
higher than income share of Shanghai. If this is the case, then why the income shares differ so much between them is interesting to explore. 3 The published household survey data are only available at a provincial level. Effort is being made to collect data on patents at the patent level. Private sector survey data are available at the firm level and this paper generates some regression results on the basis of the private sector survey data.
4 Rural-to-rural comparison means comparing the rural vicinity of Shanghai with rural China; urban-to-urban comparison means comparing the urban part of Shanghai with the urban areas of China.
I will also show that Shanghai has the curious combination of being income-rich but asset-poor. Shanghai has the highest per capita GDP in the country and its wage level is
high. Yet a typical Shanghai household has a smaller income from asset ownership than a typical household in far poorer provinces. The interest income-income from holding bank deposits-of a typical Shanghai household is extraordinarily small and it kept declining in the 1990s. And despite being located in the hottest real estate market in China, a typical Shanghai household received a rental income that was a fraction of the national average.
One way to describe the 'Shanghai model" is that the city has created the richest proletariat in the country but it has some of its poorest capitalists.
Although I do not demonstrate this point directly in this paper, let me provide a hypothesis-and some rudimentary evidence-about the mechanisms of the "Shanghai model." The key insight, I believe, has to do with the massive financial flows that the central government directed to the city in the 1990s. The mechanism was completely political.
Herein lies a deep connection between Chinese politics and Shanghai's growth model. In the 1990s, there was a rise of cadre of technocrats in the Chinese politics and many of them came from Shanghai. In the 1990s, the so-called "Shanghai gang" completely dominated the Chinese politics and they used their positions to shower massive resources on Shanghai.
There was an element of crony capitalism involved in this allocation but I think that the main motivation was to use Shanghai to carry out the technocratic visions of these leaders.
In this paper, I first show that two kinds of entrepreneurship-self employment businesses and established indigenous private-sector firms-have been under-developed in Shanghai, relative to the country as a whole, to more entrepreneurial provinces and even to some of the poorest provinces in China. I will then show that one measure of innovationpatenting activities-shows Shanghai in a poor light. The concluding section offers some speculations about the mechanisms of "Shanghai model."
Entrepreneurship in Shanghai
In 1992, a book with the title, Shanghai: Her Character is Her Destiny, became a best seller in China. The mayor of Shanghai, Wang Daohan, wrote a preface for the book. The book itself was sponsored by the Shanghai government to research the identity of the city.
The main argument of the book is that Shanghai has a distinct culture in China and its culture is characterized by "its great tolerance, diversity, individuality, and entrepreneurship."
The book went on to assert that the renaissance of Shanghai in the 1990s owed much to the city's distinct cultural heritage. The claim that the boom in Shanghai in the 1990s is a product of its entrepreneurial culture, however, is quite problematic. This paper uses survey data to generate some preliminary findings about entrepreneurial activities in Shanghai. And the main finding is that entrepreneurial activities in Shanghai lagged significantly behind the rest of the country and that some dimensions of entrepreneurial activities in Shanghai atrophied over time. We use two sets of data. One set of data draws from the annual household surveys conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). These are large-scale surveys. For example, the 1995 rural survey covered 67,000 households (0.03 percent of the rural population) and the urban survey covered 35,000 households (0.04 percent of the urban population). These household surveys are very well designed and China economists have relied on them heavily to undertake research on income distribution and savings behavior in China. 7 One part of these household surveys focuses on self employment and we will use data from this section of the 5 See Li (2001) . 6 For a very good account of the role of Shanghai industrialists in Hong Kong, see Wong (1988) . 7 One example is Kraay (2000) .
surveys to look at entrepreneurial developments in Shanghai. (More details of these household surveys are provided in the appendix.)
The other set of data came from surveys on private-sector firms in China. Private sector firms can be considered as "entrepreneurial firms" in the Chinese context. They are overwhelmingly family-owned and they are much smaller than the incumbent business establishments, such as SOEs or affiliates of MNCs (although they are larger than the selfemployment businesses.) Most of them are also first-generation entrepreneurial businesses in the sense that those with control rights are the founders of their firms. Thus these privatesector firms are considered entrepreneurial in our context both because their operators still bear the residual risks of ownership and that they disrupt the existing equilibrium in a Schumpeterian sense.
Self-employment businesses in Shanghai
The formal and legal name for self-employment businesses in China is individual household businesses. The technical definition of an individual household business is that it has a total employment of or under eight persons (including the business owners). This is the primary difference with the private-sector firms which we will look at next in that the private-sector firms are much larger in employment. In terms of their incorporation rights and responsibilities, the difference between an individual household business and a privatesector firm is quite minor. For example, all the individual household businesses and most of the private-sector firms have unlimited liabilities.
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We look at self employment activities both in urban and rural areas of Shanghai. The rural entrepreneurship is important in a number of aspects. First, while Shanghai is widely viewed as a sophisticated, cosmopolitan metropolis, a surprisingly high number of people 8 The difference in the size employment between these two types of businesses is entirely arbitrary. The second reason is that rural residents are, almost by definition, entrepreneurs.
Farmers bear the residual benefits and risks of their production because agricultural production is organized as a business. Although a large number of rural residents in China work in rural enterprises as employees (such as township and village enterprises or TVEs), many of these rural enterprises themselves were started by rural entrepreneurs. We will look at the relative returns in rural Shanghai between self-employment earnings and paid employment earnings as a way to gauge the environment facing entrepreneurs in Shanghai.
Finally, we pay special attention to rural entrepreneurship in Shanghai because of our theoretical priors. We know from the early works of Schultz (1953) that urban/industrial centers exert a powerful boosting effect on the surrounding rural areas. Economic development emanates outward from the urban centers because the farmers in their vicinity have greater access to industrial inputs, opportunities to improve their human capital and non-farm business and employment opportunities. To the extent that this idea holds true in China, one would expect that rural entrepreneurs near Shanghai to have outperformed the rest of the country on average during the explosive growth period of the 1990s.
Rural self-employed businesses
We start on the side of the production inputs-machinery and equipment in the production process-and then we will proceed to look at the earnings side of rural entrepreneurship in Shanghai. We undertake two kinds of comparisons. One is to compare Shanghai with the rest of the country; the other is to compare Shanghai across different time periods. It should be stressed that all the comparisons presented in the following paragraphs are rural-to-rural comparisons, i.e., we are comparing the rural households in Shanghai with rural households in the rest of China or rural households of another municipality (Tianjin).
We are not comparing rural Shanghai with urban China or with urban Tianjin.
The two panels of Figure 1 present a number of ratios calculated on the basis of data on the book value of production-related fixed assets in the possession of rural households.
Panel ( abundantly endowed with business opportunities in these areas but the benefits of these opportunities did not accrue to its rural residents.
Let's turn to look at the earnings side. The NBS rural surveys provide income data in two ways. One is total income, which is the sum of cash income and income in kind. The other is just cash income. The reason that income in kind can be a large portion of a farmer's total income is because under the Chinese income accounting procedures the government imputes income to the unsold production possessed by the farmers. This income accounting procedure can be potentially very arbitrary and produces variances in income estimates across different regions. Throughout this chapter, we use income data denominated on the cash basis in order to minimize some of the cross-region variances in the accounting and reporting procedures.
We measure the earnings from self employment with what the NBS describes as "household business incomes" in its surveys. According to NBS, household business incomes derive from "rural residents using households as the production or business units"
and from "production coordination and management." The sources of the business incomes include agricultural production but also cover industry, construction, transport, distribution and all other non-agricultural activities. We undertake two types of comparisons. One is to compare per capita business incomes in rural Shanghai with the rest of the country; the other is to compare per capita business incomes in rural Shanghai with wage income. Wage income, according to NBS, is labor compensation and it is entered into the surveys on a separate line as the business income. Thus wage income is the closest proxy of earnings from the paid employment. The wage income data do not appear to include benefits. There was a modest increase of the ratio between 1990 and 1995 but the ratio declined in other periods. A related observation is just how low the non-agricultural business income is relative to the wage income. The ratio never exceeded 0.1; the peak in 1995 is 0.07. There is very little evidence that rural Shanghainese were able to receive high business income streams from engaging in the non-agricultural activities.
But is the above finding driven by the fact that rural Shanghai experienced a usually fast growth in the wage income in the 1990s? Not at all. Panel (1) 
Urban self-employed businesses
We now examine self employment businesses in the urban part of Shanghai.
Shanghai is heavily industrial so if rural entrepreneurship stagnated the impact may not be so severe if the urban entrepreneurship flourished. We first present data on the number of selfemployed business owners per household in Shanghai, relative to the country as a whole and to the urban areas in two provinces, Zhejiang and Yunnan. Figure 4 presents the data. Shanghai again underperformed. We have two sets of ratios. One is calculated on the basis of data on the number of individual business owners per household; the other is calculated on the basis of data on the number of employees working in the individual businesses. (As pointed out before, individual businesses also hire a small number of people, typically less than eight employees.) There are some interesting similarities and differences between these two measures of entrepreneurship. In terms of the similarity, on a per household basis, the ratio of Shanghai relative to the country as a whole is always less than one in the four years for which data are available, 1996, 1999, 2002 and 2004 . This is in Panel (1).
There are also noticeable differences. One is that the ratios of individual business owners are significantly smaller than the ratios of individual business employees. For example, in 1999, one ratio is half of the other ratio. The other difference is that individual business owner ratio declined between 1996 and 2002. (The ratio rose slightly in 2004). The employee ratio rose or at least held steady during the same period. Taking these two findings together suggests the possibility of the following dynamic: In Shanghai, relative to the rest of the country, the constraints on business ownership were both severe and were rising during this period but the constraints on employment were easing. So Shanghai discriminated more against capital providers but not the labor working for them.
Panels (2) and (3) compare Shanghai with Zhejiang and Yunnan, respectively.
Zhejiang is known for being the most entrepreneurial province in China; Yunnan, on the other hand, is a poor, multi-ethnic and heavily rural province. Shanghai performs badly against these two extreme benchmarks. In the business owner category, not a single ratio Shanghai is a better place for employees than it is for business owners. The contrast with
Yunnan here is especially sharp. The ratios in the employee category all exceed one but the ratios in the owner category are a fraction of one.
Let's look at the earnings side. China as a whole and as those in Yunnan but they are doing significantly worse than entrepreneurs in Zhejiang.
To summarize our findings so far, we can lay out the "Shanghai model" in the following terms. The city has created an attractive environment for factory or managerial jobs but the same environment has been detrimental to those with entrepreneurial inclinations and capabilities to start and operate small-scale businesses. So the city has the highest paid proletariat in the country but it has some of its poorest capitalists. One way to illustrate the latter point is to look at asset ownership in the city. We do not have data on asset ownership but we have some data on the returns from owning assets and property.
Relative to their exalted income positions, Shanghai households turned out to have very low returns from property ownership and this is consistent with the portrayal that the city is income-rich but asset-poor.
Panel ( Another interesting finding is that the interest income in Shanghai is very low. The ratio is less than one except in 1999 when it was 1.03 and the ratio declined from 1.03 in 1999 to only 0.4 in 2004. Thus while Shanghai increased its wage payments during this period, the returns on bank deposits were decreasing at the same time. Panel (2) of Figure 6 compares Shanghai with Zhejiang, the most entrepreneurial province in China and the same patterns hold in that comparison. 
Entrepreneurial firms in Shanghai
We define "entrepreneurial firms" as indigenous private-sector firms. This definition makes sense in the Chinese context. In an economy dominated by SOEs and, increasingly, MNCs, indigenous private-sector firms are entrepreneurial in a Schumpetarian sense. They are also entrepreneurial because many of them are still run by their founders. So unlike managers in SOEs and MNCs, the managers of these private sector firms bear the residual risks and benefits of ownership. They also fit with a behavioral definition of entrepreneurship. These firms are very nimble, completely profit-driven and market-driven. This is one attribute emphasized by writers such as Frank Knight (1921) and Israel Kirzner (1979) .
To compare the state of the private-sector firms in Shanghai with those elsewhere in the country, we rely on one of the most well-designed and systematic survey projects in The main questions of the survey cover (1) firm size, status of development, organization, and operation; (2) management system and decision-making style; (3) socialeconomic background of enterprise owners; (4) social mobility and network of owners; (5) source and composition of employees and employee-employer relations; (6) self-assessment by entrepreneurs on a range of issues related to government-business relations, business environment, financing, and (7) income, expenditures and assets of entrepreneurs. Table 2 presents data on all the surveyed firms in China. Shanghai firms are smaller in sales or employment than the national average in all the years for which data are available (1990, 1992, and 2003) . The employment measure shows an even more remarkable development: The median employment declined for Shanghai firms between 1992 and 2003. This is telling on several accounts. One is that the average employment rose during the same period so this suggests that Shanghai is easier for large firms than it is for smaller firms. Second, Shanghai bucked the national trend. In every other province and in the sample as a whole, both the average and median employment rose between 1992 and 2003.
The above findings are based on a descriptive reading of the survey data and one might object that these findings do not sufficiently control for factors that might account for some of these differences between Shanghai and other regions. It is important to keep in mind that our priors ought to be very strong that given its good fundamentals and history Shanghai firms ought to be more developed than firms elsewhere. So the finding that Shanghai firms are less developed even compared with firms located in the poor Yunnan province is quite surprising.
But to allay fears about confounding influences on firm size, let me undertake a simple regression analysis to control for factors such as industry characteristics, the rural/urban location of a firm, the age of a firm, etc. The purpose here is not to explain the size of firms but to demonstrate the size of Shanghai firms after controlling for those factors affecting firm size. Table 3 presents the OLS estimates of the size of private-sector firms as measured by employment. The dependent variable is the log value of number of employees at the time of the survey. The 2004 private-sector survey provides 15 industry breakdowns and we include industry dummy variables to control for industry characteristics. We also control for the age of the firm and three rural dummy variables-whether the firm was founded in a rural area, whether the firm has its main production facility in the rural area and whether the firm is headquartered in the rural area. We arrive at the OLS estimates in three ways-1) including firms in all fifteen industries, 2) including firms in the manufacturing industry only, and 3) including firms only in service industries. Service industries refer to construction, transport, distribution/catering, finance, real estate, social services, healthcare, education, and science/technology. Our assumption is that these service industries are urban intensive and Shanghai firms would perform relatively well at least in these industries, if not across the board. There are thirty-one provinces in the private-sector survey so I coded thirty-one provincial dummy variables. In the OLS regression, the Shanghai dummy variable is omitted so all the other provinces are benchmarked against Shanghai. Shanghai firms would be larger compared with a province, ceteris paribus, if the dummy variable for that province is negative and statistically significant. Shanghai firms would be smaller otherwise. Table 3 arrays the provinces according to their economic size relative to Shanghai. At the top of the 
Is Shanghai innovative?
Stephen Green, an economist at UBS based in Shanghai, wrote that Shanghai authorities liked to treat foreign visitors with a tour of Fuxing Group, a Shanghai's based private sector pharmaceutical firm. The purpose was to showcase "Shanghai's vibrant private, high-tech economy," Green observed (p. 153).
There are at least two errors in Green's observation-that Shanghai has a vibrant private economy and that its economy is high-tech. I have already shown that in terms of business income and income from holding assets Shanghai is remarkably poor, not just in comparison with the entrepreneurial Zhejiang and Guangdong but also in comparison with some of the poorest regions of China. In this section I will deal with the second of Green's observation-that Shanghai has a high-tech economy. We first look at the results of 11 The results are not shown and are available from the author upon request.
analyzing the 2004 private-sector survey and then present some aggregate data on patenting activities.
Private-sector surveys
We use a measure of technological development that is probably as good as anypatenting activities. Patenting is widely used by economists as a measure of innovations or competitiveness of firms or regions. The idea stressed in the literature is that firms are naturally motivated to build up their intellectual property rights in order to gain a competitive edge in the marketplace. 12 Competitiveness is a complex phenomenon but patent data provide a convenient starting point to assess whether Shanghai firms are competitive vis-à-vis firms elsewhere in China.
There is also a Shanghai-specific reason to look at patenting activities. Let's revisit Table 2 Panel (3) of that table presents descriptive data on the state of technology on the part of indigenous private sector firms in Shanghai compared with their counterparts elsewhere. We present data on the percentage share of firms which hold patents and of those patent-holding firms the average number of patents they hold. We also have data on whether or not a firm has developed its own products and if it has, how many. Shanghai firms under-performed-i.e. having fewer products developed by the firm-than all the firms in the benchmarked provinces and against the national average.
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Statistical analysis yields a similar finding. 14 We use the number of patents as the dependent variable in regressions with the provincial dummies and the same set of controls we used in regressions on the size of firms. The 2004 private-sector survey also asked the respondents to provide information on the number of products developed in-house. We also use this measure to assess the innovativeness of Shanghai firms. We restrict our analysis to manufacturing firms only since these two measures are most germane to manufacturing firms. In terms of patents held by firms, Shanghai firms are outperformed by firms in four other provinces and they do not outperform firms in any other provinces. In terms of inhouse product developments, Shanghai firms are outperformed by firms in six other provinces and they do not outperform firms in any other provinces. There is no evidence whatsoever that Shanghai firms are more innovative than firms elsewhere and this finding, combined with the finding that Shanghai firms are unduly small, points to the problematic state of Shanghai's private sector.
Aggregate patent data
I have cross-checked several sources on Chinese patents. Chinese patent data, unlike its economic data, are quite consistent across different sources and are clearly labeled and 13 Ideally, we would want to show a longer series of data but the private sector surveys only began to collect data on patents in 2002.
14 The results are available upon request. Technology (1999) and (2002). 15 All the patents used in this paper refer to patents granted by the Chinese patent authorities. Otherwise unless noted, all the patent data refer to patent grants rather than patent applications.
We compare the patenting activities in Shanghai with two of the more entrepreneurial provinces in China, Zhejiang and Guangdong. Another finding in Hu and Jefferson (2006) accords better with our findings here.
They found that private-sector firms have the highest propensity to patent as compared with SOEs or even with affiliates of MNCs. Thus one hypothesis to explain this decline of Shanghai vis-à-vis Zhejiang and Guangdong is that Shanghai has repressed the part of the economy most likely to innovate-its entrepreneurial sector. And it is in this connection that the two parts of this paper on the microeconomic dimensions of Shanghai reinforce each other in generating an empirically more accurate portrayal of Shanghai.
There may be two alternative hypotheses. One is that because we are comparing total patent counts we are not controlling for the potential pool of firms or institutions that generate patents. Guangdong and Zhejiang may simply have a larger pool of potential patent-generating firms. This hypothesis is difficult to test because we do not have a measure of the potential pools of the patent generations. However, it is important to stress that Shanghai led Zhejiang and Guangdong in the 1980s by a huge margin in total patent counts.
So if the declining curves in the graph are a result of expanding pools in Guangdong and Zhejiang, then the appropriate question is why the potential pool of patent generations expanded in these two provinces but it shrank in Shanghai. In fact, this is the crux of the entire issue: Zhejiang and Guangdong enabled the firms based there to become more innovative or provided a business environment attracting more innovative firms to them.
That fact itself suggests some substantial differences between Shanghai on the one hand and
Zhejiang and Guangdong on the other.
The second hypothesis is that this is a natural technological diffusion story whereby laggard provinces catch up with the leader. However, this explanation does not quite accord with a number of features in the data. Notice that the speed of Shanghai's decline was particularly dramatic in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. In 1987, the ratio was 1.8 vis-à-vis Zhejiang and 3.18 vis-à-vis Guangdong. In four short years, the ratios fell below one for both Shanghai/Zhejiang and Shanghai/Guangdong pairs. The logic of the diffusion story would suggest a smoother decline stretched over a period of years.
The other fact does not sit well with the diffusion logic. If the technological diffusion is the only driver behind the rise of Zhejiang and Guangdong, then we would see
Shanghai's decline to be primarily concentrated in the less demanding areas of utility model and design patents, not in the invention patents. It is only natural that the backward regions first master the less sophisticated technologies. It is an incremental process. But as we see in the data, Shanghai lost its edge vis-à-vis Zhejiang and Guangdong also in the invention patents as well.
Some concluding remarks
In this part of the paper, let me speculate about the actual mechanisms of the the Maglev train, etc.-but it laid out some mechanisms to achieve this goal. One mechanism was known as "integrated rural/urban planning" and a super municipal agency was set up to carry out the planning. The agency was headed by Mayor Jiang Zemin. The idea of "integrated rural/urban planning" is that rural and urban economies should be planned in conjunction with each other and in a context of a planned economy this would inevitably suggest an extension of urban controls over the rural areas. This may be one reason why the rural entrepreneurship began to atrophy in Shanghai in the 1990s. The urban part of Shanghai economy in the early 1990s was completely state-owned; the rural part less so. Thus the integrated planning approach amounted to a takeover of a less state-controlled economy by an economy that was more state-controlled.
Finally, I believe that a critical piece of the puzzle is to understand the land policies of the Shanghai government. We know that in the 1990s the Shanghai government or its business affiliates have engaged in a massive real estate program. The basic mechanism is very simple. The government would reclaim the buildings and land from the incumbent residents and then lease the land to real estate developers. The government is the monopoly on the buy side and would pay far below the fair market value to acquire the land but it would sell or lease the land to the highest bidder. The program was massive. According to one estimate, between 1992 and 1997, the government demolished 22.46 million square meters of building area and 541,400 households were displaced (Zhang 2002) . The issue for this paper is to think about the effect of this land policy on entrepreneurship in Shanghai. Figure 6 shows that the per capita rental income in urban Shanghai is extremely low. The ratio relative to the country as a whole was 0.01 in 1996 and 0.3 in 1999. One explanation for this low returns on rental property is that the government restricted private land lease. This finding provides an important clue as to why small-scale entrepreneurship in Shanghai is so under-developed. Both rural and urban entrepreneurs run businesses that are land-intensive and/or that may be location-demanding. Rural entrepreneurs need land to build factories and they need space in the urban areas to hawk their ware. Urban entrepreneurs similarly need fixed points of services since many of them specialize in service provisions that require them to be in places of high population density.
The tight control of land may have suppressed the entrepreneurial supply on the hand and on the other reduced the rental income to the average Shanghai households who otherwise could have leased their housing facilities to would-be service sector entrepreneurs. This explanation would explain why rental income per capita is much higher in the more laissezfaire provinces in China.
about 4.8 million households. Displacing 541,400 households would suggest that 11 percent of Shanghai households lived in slums in the mid-1990s. 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Year
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